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In the 1990s Emotional Intelligence (EI) emerged as a major phenomenon. 
Today, its influence can be seen in Psychology, in Organisational Theory, and 
in Human Resource Management. To date, most theoretical and empirical 
work on the concept has taken place within the disciplines of Psychology and 
Management. Remarkably, the disciplines of Cultural Studies and History 
have remained relatively silent on the issue of EI.   
This paper seeks to redress that imbalance. Using Bauman’s work on liquid 
modernity as a starting point, I seek to show how EI is a cultural construct of 
the knowledge-based economies that characterise the present age of 
globalisation.  In this sense, EI can be seen as a postmodern advance 
beyond that great construct of modernity: IQ. Certainly, EI is perfectly suitable 
for a more democratised workplace, where hierarchies of power and 
managerial control have given way to lateral networks and flattened 
organisational structures. Considered as a cultural construct, the concept also 
has much to tell us about the contemporary human subject as well as the 
contemporary economy.  
I shall argue, however, that the concept remains trapped between modernity 
and postmodernity.  This is because it retains many of the essentialist 
assumptions of IQ, despite superficial appearances to the contrary. Lastly, I 
shall argue that Cultural Studies and History have much to offer to those who 
seek an understanding of the potential and the limitations of EI. 
It should be noted, however, that although the terms modernity and 
postmodernity might more commonly be used, and in fact could be used, I 
shall use the terms ‘solid modernity’ and ‘liquid modernity’.  For reasons that I 
hope shall become clear, these terms seem more evocative in the context of 
the argument that I make. 
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Emotional Intelligence and Liquid Modernity:  A Cultural Construct for 
the 21st Century 
Introduction 
Emotional Intelligence (EI) is a rare concept:  it is both an academic and a popular 
phenomenon.  As such, it has generated a vast literature.  The narrow spread of the 
academic literature is, however, anomalous.  Remarkably, it is concentrated in the 
disciplines of psychology, organisational studies and human resource management.  
Despite EI appearing to be a cultural phenomenon, and certainly an area ripe for 
discursive and deconstructive analysis, there has been virtually a total lack of interest 
from the discipline of cultural studies.  Furthermore, despite the rather obvious fact 
that the concept represents a development from the much older concept of IQ, and 
would therefore seem to be of historical interest, historians have shown the same 
lack of interest as that shown by their colleagues in cultural studies.  This paper 
attempts to fill a gap in the literature relating to EI by focusing on the cultural, 
discursive and historical aspects of the term. 
In doing so, I shall use the terms ‘solid modernity’ and ‘liquid modernity, but readers 
familiar with the literature of modernity and postmodernity will appreciate that what I 
have to say is relevant to that field.  The very use of such terms, however, prompts 
me to add a qualifying note.  There is a danger of reductionism in linking IQ to solid 
modernity and EI to liquid modernity.  Thought is undoubtedly located in history and 
culture, but the attempt to organise patterns of thought into specific temporal 
divisions and rigid classifications is itself an excellent target for deconstruction.  This 
is a problem common to most forms of intellectual history, but it is particularly acute 
in this paper. In a paper of this length there is an instrumental impulse to be overly 
schematic in the manner I have just suggested.  Considered in this light, the 
following argument should be seen as an attempt to outline the framework for a new 
intellectual trajectory in the study of EI rather than as an attempt at closure.  
Solid and Liquid Modernity 
In the discussion of the cultural specificities of IQ and EI that follows, I shall draw a 
distinction between solid modernity and liquid modernity. In drawing such a 
distinction I am adopting the terminology, and some of the analytical framework, of 
Bauman (2000).  I shall categorise the time period 1870-1970 as solid modernity, 
and I shall categorise the period since then as liquid modernity.  I suggest that solid 
modernity reached its high point in the period stretching from Taylorism to Fordism, 
and that the regulated period of the Keynesian consensus, extending from the end of 
WWII to the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s, was the period 
of solid modernity that established the preconditions for the transition to liquid 
modernity. Since the focus of this paper is the emergence of IQ and the subsequent 
emergence of EI, the question of whether or not a significant period of time prior to 
the 1870s can also be categorised as solid modernity is not particularly pressing.  I 
have chosen the early 1970s as the marking point for a transition to liquid modernity 
not only because the forces of solid modernity had ushered in large scale social 
change during the mid-1960s, which gathered rapid pace in the 1970s, but also 
because the international economic foundation of post-war solid modernity, the 
Bretton Woods regulatory framework, disintegrated in the early 1970s.  Furthermore, 
it was in the aftermath of the collapse of the Bretton Woods system that a number of 
other significant organisational, technological and political developments occurred:  
globalisation, the end of the Keynesian consensus, the collapse of communism, the 
development of the internet, the increasing internal deregulation of Western 
economies, the emergence of a knowledge economy, and a shift in organisational 
structures from those displaying vertical hierarchies of power and managerial control 
to those displaying more flattened forms based on teams, democratisation and 
lateral communicative flows.  In short, there was a shift from standardised mass 
production and bureaucratic administration to light and flexible forms of production 
and administration. 
These changes should not be seen as an arbitrary list of unconnected historical 
events, plucked at random in order to lend credence to the organising concepts of 
solid and liquid modernity. There is a common theme.  Solid modernity was 
exemplified by ontological essentialism, discrete vertical structures, and clear 
boundaries between each structure.  These boundaries were evident in the Cold 
War, in the fixed exchange rate system that characterised Bretton Woods, in the 
restrictions placed on the flow of capital and goods, in the doctrine of sovereignty of 
nations, in the distinction between public and private ownership, in the racial 
attitudes and policies pursued in countries such as the US, Britain and Australia, in 
the strength of the class system in countries such as Britain, in the robust and 
entrenched division between capital and organised labour, in the prevalence of clear 
gender stereotypes, and in the repressive attitude to homosexuality.  Such 
distinctions divided the world into discrete systems, structures, entities and ideas, all 
of which were based on seemingly rational and essentialist principles.  Each 
structure was conceived in vertical terms, and at the deep core of each was a 
bounded essence.  These structures were replicated even in the two great, 
seemingly radical, thinkers of modernity:  Marx and Freud.  Marx’s thought was 
erected on an architectural metaphor of base and superstructure.  The 
superstructure masked the deeper essentialist reality of the economic base and the 
appropriation of surplus labour value that arose from it.  In the case of Freud, there 
was a deep primal reality masked by repression and other psychoanalytic processes 
(Freud, 1964). 
Liquid modernity can be characterised by the decline of vertical power structures, the 
declining significance of clear boundaries between nations and races, the receding 
significance of the autonomous nation state, the decline of the international doctrine 
of sovereignty of nations and the concomitant rise of human rights law, the rise of 
multiculturalism, feminism and gay rights, the shift from tangible to intangible goods, 
the increased significance of lateral flows of information and ideas, and the shift from 
an onto-theological conception of a centred self to a poststructuralist conception of a 
decentred self as exemplified in the thought of thinkers like Derrida (1976) and Lacan 
(1977).  In the field of intelligence, I shall argue that the shift from the vertical and 
substantive structures of solid modernity to the lateral flows of liquid modernity is 
represented by the shift from IQ to emotional intelligence.  It will become evident, 
however, that these distinctions are themselves in a state of some fluidity. 
IQ and Solid Modernity  
Considered from the perspective of the cultural historian, IQ and EI can be 
understood as constructs of their own respective eras.  IQ expressed a desire to 
attach a single numerical value to a human being.  This numerical value was 
standardised across the entire population of individuals, and hence it allowed each 
individual to be ranked with respect to the entire population. In this sense, the 
concept fulfilled a function that class, on its own, could no longer fulfil.  Indeed, by 
the late nineteenth century the concept of class itself needed to accommodate the 
rise of the new moneyed and professional groups created by the industrial revolution.  
From the 1870s onwards the English aristocracy, whose superiority had been 
entrenched in tradition and supported by heredity, was in relative decline.  By that 
time the industrial revolution had penetrated almost every area of British life.  By the 
twentieth century that revolution had reached explosive dimensions in both the 
United States and Germany.  Increasingly a middle class comprised of technocrats 
and professionals was in the ascendancy.  WWI, by disrupting existing structures, 
accelerated this trend.  
IQ provided a means of measuring the innate abilities of these aspirational groups.  
The concept also had one other attractive feature:  it sought solidity and substance in 
an essentialist ontology of the self; but it did so in a decidedly modern manner, free 
of onto-theological foundations.  IQ was conceived as a set of attributes or skills that 
resided deep within the individual (Cianciolo, A & Sternberg, R, 2004: 2-3).  
Admittedly, there was a counter-current of thought, especially from the 1960s, that 
placed more emphasis than hitherto on nurture and environment rather than on 
genetics and heredity, but this perspective was really a challenge to the early and 
primary tendency, represented by Galton (1869), to see IQ in terms of genes.  
Indeed, the idea of a fixed, bounded and essentialist category of intelligence has 
always been the point of reference and departure for those engaged in the debate 
about IQ. 
In the modernity of the early twentieth century the concept of IQ drew boundaries 
around the potentially ceaseless process of social change.  In attributing to the liberal 
autonomous individual an innate and unchanging set of techno-ontological attributes, 
the concept of IQ mediated between stasis and change, between solid and fluid.  
Culturally situated in this stage of modernity, the concept allowed entry into the upper 
classes at a moment when economic, industrial and political change rendered 
existing rationales for the existence of entrenched classes, unrelated to any 
consideration of merit, inconsistent with new democratic imperatives.  If the concept 
of IQ provided a rationale for such upward socio-economic movement, then it did so 
only on the basis of the innate superiority of the new entrant to the middle and upper 
classes.  Accordingly, the concept could be meshed with existing concepts of class.  
It measured cognitive abilities which, in a society characterised increasingly by a 
mental-manual division of labour, were necessarily seen as higher order skills.  
Moreover, these skills were innate in the sense that they were present at birth and 
were thought to change very little over the course of an individual’s life, and even 
then they did so for reasons that were essentially biological. IQ was thus based on a 
new techno-biological form of ontological essentialism.  Considered as such, it was 
implicitly free of the moral and theological aspects that characterised preceding 
forms of ontological essentialism.  
In this regard, IQ was startlingly modern.  In every sense, the concept promised to 
fuse technical and cognitive skills with a static or enduring metaphysics of individual 
substance.  Individuals with innate abilities that were clearly defined, scientifically 
based and statistically measured could gain entry to class positions that would 
hitherto have been denied to them. 
This class was increasingly managerial in its orientation. In this sense the concept of 
IQ fitted perfectly with the ideal organisational form of modernity: the bureaucracy.  In 
the industrial imagination, all organisation forms showed some bureaucratic features:  
they were organised hierarchically, and they were based on the assumption that all 
jobs could be broken down into discrete and standardised units or skills that were 
therefore amenable to scientific management. 
Conceptions of Emotional Intelligence:  Straddling Solid Modernity and Liquid 
Modernity 
EI has its antecedents in the age of solid modernity.  Thorndike (1920) developed a 
concept of ‘social intelligence’, which was taken up by Gardner (1983) when he 
incorporated it into his theory of multiple intelligences.  The concept was taken to a 
higher level of conceptual sophistication in the early 1990s by Mayer and Salovey 
(1990, 1993) when they colonised Gardner’s personal intelligences, both inter and 
intra, and subsumed them in their own concept of emotional intelligence.  In the mid-
1990s Goleman (1995) imprinted the concept on the popular imagination when he 
drew on the work of Mayer and Salovey and wrote a bestseller.  In the late 1990s he 
followed this with another popular work in which he examined the concept’s specific 
relevance to individual success in the workplace (Goleman, 1998).   
In the discussion that follows I shall deal mainly with the work of Goleman, but in 
order to highlight what I take to be his paradigmatic expression of the concept it is 
useful to distinguish his work from that of Mayer and Salovey, as well as from the 
work of some other authors who also use the concept.  The reason for making these 
distinctions is to clarify why Goleman’s work is situated in the culture of liquid 
modernity, whereas the work of Mayer and Salovey, while still displaying most of the 
features of liquid modernity, shows a greater link to solid modernity than does the 
work of Goleman.  Others, such as Simmons and Simmons (1997), can be situated 
at an earlier stage of liquid modernity.  Their conception bears more resemblance to 
that of Gardner than it does to that of Mayer and Salovey.  Gardner broadened the 
concept of intelligence, but his boundaries were still fairly tightly drawn and his focus 
was still predominantly cognitive rather than relational and self-reflexive.  His work 
did have elements of these, but to some extent Gardner also thought that his various 
intelligences were related to the structure of the brain.  In this search for an innate 
physiological basis to intelligence there is a strong residue of solid modernity.  This 
element of ontological essentialism found in Gardner is present to a lesser extent in 
Mayer and Salovey, and almost entirely absent in Goleman.  It is, however, very 
significant in the work of Simmons and Simmons.  They cast a wider net than 
Gardner did, and they also cast it more in the direction of emotional elements than 
he did, but to the extent that they work with 26 relatively unchanging character traits 
their understanding of EI still represents a skills-based form of ontological 
essentialism, albeit one whose boundaries are wider than those of both IQ and 
Gardner’s multiple intelligences.  The human subject, however, is still centred, and 
this is expressed by a structured set of innate attributes.  In this sense, their theory 
straddles solid modernity and liquid modernity. 
Mayer and Salovey’s work moves much further towards liquid modernity than does 
the work of other theorists of EI, with the exception of Goleman.  Their categorisation 
is significantly relational and self-reflexive, but it also contains a strong cognitive 
component that bears some resemblance to technical, task-based conceptions of IQ 
(Mayer and Salovey, 1997: 5).  Their position does, however, represent a significant 
departure from IQ, because their conceptualisation of EI undercuts the modern, and 
indeed pre-modern, binary opposition between emotion and reason.  This binary 
conception of the human subject stretches all the way back to Plato (Despret, 2004: 
149-151), and is even embodied in Freud’s architectural conception of the human 
subject.  In Freud, one of the emblematic thinkers of solid modernity, there is a 
primal reality residing beneath a rational layer.  In his conception, the primal forces 
are mediated by the calculative reasoning of the ego as it goes about attaining a 
rationally optimal balance between pleasure and pain in the context of a given 
external reality.  In Freud’s metaphysics of substance, however, the human subject 
cannot really know or change the emotional states that arise from deep primal 
forces, except, of course, through extensive psychoanalysis.  As a result, civilisation 
involves discontents (Freud, 1961). 
Generally, Mayer and Salovey have cut though this binary separation of emotion and 
rationality.  At the very least, they do not see them as antithetical.  On the contrary, 
they see them as working together. There is, however, a sense in which they still 
adopt a weak binary position. Although their work assumes a kind of liquid 
relationship between emotion and cognition, it must be said that there is also a sense 
in which emotions are thought to work in the service of cognition by fast-tracking, or 
streamlining, the cognitive function.  At some points (Mayer et al 1999: 267) they 
come close to resurrecting a vertical architecture of the human subject, of a sort that 
is more relevant to the conceptions of solid modernity than to those of liquid 
modernity. In their conception of this vertical hierarchy they posit a technocratic self 
that can draw on underlying emotional content, as if it is a resource, in order to 
achieve efficient outcomes. The individual subject, they say, ‘can reason and 
problem-solve on the basis of’ emotions. In this sense, Mayer and Salovey effectively 
invert the Freudian conception by positing rational managerial control over a 
knowable and malleable emotional resource base:  whereas in Freud the emotions 
are dominant, albeit disguised, in Mayer and Salovey the technocratic, or managerial 
self, is in control.  In conceptualising the relationship between emotions and 
rationality in this way, Mayer and Salovey also invoke remnants of a technical, or 
problem-solving, conception of IQ: There is a sense in which this is both an 
essentialist and technocratic ontology.  
There is also another element that needs to be considered.  To think of EI in this way 
is see it in economic terms. Considered in this light, the rationale for EI is similar to 
the rationale for the firm put forward by Coase (1937).  He argued that by providing a 
framework for the huge number of small contractual exchanges between resources 
that would otherwise take place, the firm was able to lower its search and transaction 
costs and thereby enhance its economic efficiency.  Mayer and Salovey’s conception 
appears to contain such Coasean elements.  So conceived, EI expedites the 
cognitive process and thereby renders it more technically efficient.  It is not difficult to 
understand why such a conception might seem culturally attractive in the 21st 
century.  By performing a streamlining function for the intellect in a fast, diverse and 
complex world bedevilled by information overload, Mayer and Salovey’s 
understanding of EI promises to empower a human subject cut adrift from stable 
organisational structures and institutions.  
The remnants of solid modernity evident in Mayer and Salovey’s work remain 
distinctive features of their conception of EI (Mayer and Salovey, 1997). To a greater 
extent than Goleman, they place considerable emphasis on perception, appraisal 
and analysis of emotions, and generally they seek to show the significance of 
emotional analysis to knowledge and intellectual growth.  Indeed, the elucidation of 
links between emotion and thinking are strong features of their work.  While 
recognising this orientation, the elements of solid modernity in their work should not 
be overstated. There are aspects of their work that are very liquid.  Along with 
Goleman, Mayer (and presumably his colleagues) believes that emotional 
intelligence is not innate, fixed or rigid, but is something that develops throughout the 
life of the individual.  It is even something that the individual can work on. (Goleman, 
1998:239-240). In this regard, the conception of the human subject posited by Mayer 
et al is far more malleable than the human subject of solid modernity. 
If Mayer et al straddle solid and liquid modernity, then Goleman is situated very 
decisively in liquid modernity.  Although he developed the work of Mayer and 
Salovey, he should in no way be seen as a mere populariser of their work.  
Significantly, his ‘Emotional Competence Framework’ is almost entirely self-reflexive 
and socially relational (Goleman 1995, 26-27).  This stands in contrast with the 
greater emphasis on cognitive skills that is evident in the work of Mayer et al.  
Goleman also emphasises motivation, which is virtually absent from the concerns of 
Mayer et al. Furthermore, his emphasis on empathy, social skills, self-awareness 
and self-regulation reflects a desire to keep the emotional process in a constant state 
of motion.  Indeed, Goleman seems more concerned with emotional flows and 
circuits rather than with the creation and development of emotional and intellectual 
stocks. In Mayer et al there is a latent desire to transform emotions into knowledge, 
and thereby to fix them in a manner that gestures towards the precepts of solid 
modernity.  Furthermore, there is a sense in their work of an internal separation 
between emotions and thought.  Indeed, there is a replication, albeit it a compressed 
form, of the subject-object distinction even within the internal workings of the human 
subject.  By contrast, Goleman’s orientation seems to break down the internal 
distance between emotions and thought. Considered from this perspective, 
Goleman’s orientation is towards a fluid concern with intermingled flows rather than 
with establishing a cognitive distance from emotions in the interests of appraisal and 
intellectual development   For Goleman (1998:239-243) the human subject can be in 
a constant process of making and unmaking itself, of learning and unlearning habits 
and patterns of thoughts.  Whereas the early advocates of IQ were influenced by 
Darwin, Goleman seems to be more influenced by recent concepts of neurological 
Darwinism.  If early theorists of IQ regarded cognitive abilities as innate, Goleman 
believes that the human subject can mould its plastic mind and lay down new neural 
networks and circuits. For Goleman, flows are important, and the human subject is 
capable of riding these flows in a continuous process of change, conceived broadly 
to encompass neuronal, psychological and emotional elements.  
In this regard, Goleman’s theory of EI is remarkably liquid.  This becomes clear when 
it is appreciated how Goleman considers the relationship that his twenty five 
emotional competencies have to different occupations and work situations.  There is 
no sense here in which it can be thought that Goleman has in mind a single 
measurement of EI; and nor can it be thought that his concept of EI is either fixed or 
bounded.  His competencies are the equivalent of designer labels: they can be 
woven, and mixed and interrelated in creative ways, to develop a flexible and 
malleable emotional product that can be pitched, as the product equivalent of a one-
off, at a target niche in the workplace market (Goleman, 1998: 259-262).  This is 
boutique EI in a fashion-conscious consumer market of rapidly moving lateral flows. 
The value that Goleman places on the creation of human networks also reveals the 
importance he attaches to flows.  For Goleman, the emotionally intelligent individual 
will be constantly moulding, shaping and weaving emotional connections with others 
who may be of value.  Both internally and externally, the emotionally intelligent 
human subject is making and remaking itself according to shifting currents.  The 
cultural specificity of such a conception will soon become evident when I discuss 
briefly the organisational context into which the emotionally intelligent subject of 
liquid modernity must pitch its product. 
Before doing this, it is useful to draw attention to one very small part of Goleman’s 
emotional competencies that might reasonably be said to evoke the idea of solid 
modernity.  It is ‘trustworthiness’.  This concept is surely based on a metaphysics of 
depth and presence lacking in liquid modernity.  As Sennett (1998) has argued, we 
live in times that have witnessed a corrosion of character. Furthermore, we can really 
only trust another when we believe that that person will commit to a principle and not 
yield to compelling utilitarian reasons that he or she not do so.  In a world of rapidly 
shifting contacts and connections with others, we need, as Dunn (1990: 85) argues, 
‘to economize on trust in persons’.  The idea of trustworthiness, rooted as it is in the 
onto-theological essentialism of the early period of solid modernity, is therefore 
inconsistent with Goleman’s other emotional competencies.   
EI and the Transformation of the Organisational Context 
The collapse of the Bretton Woods system was inevitable from the moment that the 
post-war economic expansion created levels of private wealth sufficient to 
overwhelm the aggregated foreign exchange reserves held by central banks.  The 
faster, more liquid and more competitive world that emerged after the collapse 
shifted pressure to the rigid barriers that existed within each country.  In the 1980s 
this pressure ushered in a rash of policies:  these included Thatcherism, 
privatisation, microeconomic reform, competition policy, financial and other forms of 
industry deregulation, and public sector reform.  In the corporate sector there was a 
shift to leaner and more flexible organisational structures.  Alongside corporate 
downsizing and outsourcing, there was a dismantling of vertical power structures and 
the creation of lateral structures based on teams (Galbraith, 2000).   
These new organisational structures accelerated information flows and directed them 
to where they were needed.  This had obvious benefits, but it also generated greater 
complexity.  Specifically, employees freed from rigid managerial control from above 
could more easily find themselves in conflict with others in the organisation. The 
need for emotional flexibility became paramount (Kilmann, 1985).  
In this context, Goleman’s conception of EI is perfectly suited to meet the demands 
that arise from these new organisational structures.  In effect, Goleman has 
developed a concept that assumes the individual human subject can make and 
remake itself on a more or less continuous basis.  This is fortunate, because 
organisations are also in a constant process of change, and the information flows 
within organisations, and the people who mediate them, may also be in a constant 
process of change.  Fluidity, emotions and the demand for emotional intelligence are 
everywhere in this age of liquid modernity.  It is truly a cultural construct for the 21st 
century. 
Conclusion 
There is a need to liberate EI from the confines of management theory and 
psychology.  The concept is too problematic to remain exclusively within those 
disciplines.  A cultural studies approach, infused with a sense of history, can reveal 
just how problematic the concept is.  On the other hand a study of EI, and the 
discursive strategies employed by many of its theorists, has much to offer to the 
student of contemporary culture. 
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